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STRATE V. A-i CONTRACTORS: A PERSPECTIVE
LAWRENCE E. KING**
"It is a case where [the law] . .. is sought to be extended over aliens
and strangers; over the members of a community, separated by race, by
tradition, by the instincts ... from the authority and power which seeks
to impose upon them the restraints of an external and unknown code,
and to subject them to the responsibilities of civil conduct, according to
rules and penalties of which they could have no previous warning; which
judges them by a standard made by others, and not for them, which takes
no account of the conditions which should except them from its exac-
tions, and makes no allowance for their inability to understand it. It tries
them not by their peers, nor by the customs of their people, nor the law
of their land, but by ... a different race, according to the law of a social
state of which they have an imperfect conception, and which is opposed
to the traditions of their history, to the habits of their lives, to the
strongest prejudices of their . . . nature; one which measures the red
man's revenge by the maxims of the white man's morality."'
I. INTRODUCTION
The main purpose of this article is to provide a review and analysis
of the United States Supreme Court decision of Strate v. A-i Contrac-
tors. 2 This article will also attempt to briefly examine federal court
decisions and the future of tribal civil jurisdiction over nonmembers
following the Strate case.
* This article is the second installment of a two-part series. The first installment of the Strate
case can be found in Volume 74:4 of the North Dakota Law Review.
** Lawrence E. King is a partner in the law firm of Zuger Kirmis & Smith, Bismarck, North
Dakota. He graduated from the University of North Dakota School of Law in 1992. His practice
involves general civil litigation, Indian law and tribal jurisdiction, and workers compensation law. He
is licensed in North Dakota state courts, Minnesota state courts, North Dakota federal courts, the
Turtle Mountain Band of Chippewa Indians, the Three Affiliated Tribes for the Fort Berthold
Reservation, the Spirit Lake Sioux Nation, the Standing Rock Sioux Nation, and the Sisseton Wahpeton
Sioux Tribe. He represents both plaintiffs and defendants in tribal courts. The author assisted Patrick
J. Ward, a partner with Zuger Kirmis & Smith, in representing Lyle Stockert and A-I Contractors in
the case before the United State Supreme Court. The author would like to thank Patrick J. Ward for
allowing him to assist on the case and for his expertise and tutelage throughout the experience. The
author would also like to thank his wife and family who have been instrumental in supporting his
practice, including that in tribal court.
1. Ex parte Crow Dog, 109 U.S. 556, 571 (1883) (eloquently describing how the Indian
defendant in that case would feel in a "foreign" court).
2. 117 S. Ct. 1404 (1997). This article will not attempt to outline the historical background and
development of Indian law in this country. For an in depth analysis of the development of Indian law
in this country, see L. Scott Gould, The Consent Paradigm: Tribal Sovereignty at the Millennium, 96
COLUM. L. REV. 809 (1996).
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Part II of this article will provide the factual background of the case
as it was presented to the United States Supreme Court. Part III will
outline the procedural history of the case as it made its way from the
tribal courthouse in Fort Yates, North Dakota, to the United States
Supreme Court in Washington, D.C. Part IV of this article will outline
the legal arguments and issues as they were presented to the United
States Supreme Court. Part V will analyze the United States Supreme
Court's decision in Strate v. A-1. Part VI will provide a brief review and
analysis of federal court decisions issued subsequent to, and applying,
the Strate analytical framework. Part VII will conclude this article and
provide this writer's analysis of the future of tribal court civil jurisdiction
over nonmembers.
II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
On November 9, 1990, Mr. Lyle Stockert [Stockert], a non-Indian,
was driving a GMC tandem axle gravel truck owned by A-1 Contractors
[A-I], a non-Indian owned business with its principle place of business
off the reservation. He was traveling in a northbound lane on North
Dakota Highway 8,3 near Twin Buttes, North Dakota, within the exterior
boundaries of the Fort Berthold Indian Reservation. 4 A-1 had entered
into a landscaping subcontract with LCM, an alleged subsidiary of the
tribe, to perform landscaping on a tribal community building. At the
time Stockert was traveling north in the northbound lane, Gisela
Fredericks [Fredericks] was traveling south in the northbound lane.
Apparently Fredericks was driving in the wrong lane as she was prepar-
ing to turn off of Highway 8 to her residence. Although Stockert
attempted to avoid a collision, Fredericks, also a non-Indian, 5 was injured
when her vehicle struck the rear of the truck being operated by Stockert.
Local law enforcement responded to the accident after State Radio
broadcast for a unit to cover the accident. Both the county Sheriff and a
3. North Dakota Highway 8 crosses 6.59 miles of land within the reservation before it ends at the
shores of Lake Sakakawea. Lake Sakakawea was created by the damming of the Missouri River
pursuant to the 1944 Flood Control Act and is under the control of the Army Corps of Engineers. The
easement provides that the State of North Dakota has control and responsibility for the realignment,
improvement, and maintenance of Highway 8. The highway has always been open to the general
public.
4. The Fort Berthold Reservation is located in central North Dakota. The Three Affiliated Tribes
reside on the reservation which consists of the Mandan, Hidatsa, and Arikara Indians. The
Reservation contains almost as many nonmembers as member residents (2,999 enrolled tribal members
and 2,458 nonmembers, of whom 2,396 are non-Indians). See United States Department of
Commerce, Bureau of the Census, 1990 Census of Population.
5. Although Ms. Fredericks is a non-Indian, she was married to an enrolled member of the Three
Affiliated Tribes of the Fort Berthold Reservation. She also had five adult children who were named
plaintiffs in the Tribal Court action. The adult children were all enrolled members of the Three
Affiliated Tribes.
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local Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) officer arrived on the scene. The
BIA officer allowed the sheriff to conduct the investigation since the
accident involved non-Indians. Fredericks was cited for being on the
wrong side of the road at the time of the accident. The only damage to
the truck was to the rear set of dual tires on the left side of the truck.
The outside tire was flat and the wheels were pushed toward the inside of
the truck. Fredericks' vehicle was seriously damaged and rescue crews
needed to use the "jaws of life" in order to extricate Fredericks from
the vehicle. Fredericks sustained serious injuries in the accident and was
hospitalized for twenty-four days.6
III. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On May 9, 1991, Fredericks sued Stockert, A-I, and its insurer, in
tribal court seeking damages for personal injuries she received in the
accident and claiming bad faith against A-i's insurer.7 Fredericks'
adult children, also named plaintiffs, asked for damages for loss of
consortium in the litigation. The complaint set forth a request for
compensatory damages in excess of $3,032,000 and punitive damages in
the amount of $10,000,000.
Stockert made a special appearance and filed a motion to dismiss
the action against him on the grounds that the tribal court lacked person-
al jurisdiction over him and jurisdiction over the subject matter of the
litigation; A-1 joined in the motion. 8 In response to the motion, the only
evidence the plaintiffs advanced concerning the relationship between
Stockert, A-I, and the tribe was to proffer a copy of a subcontract
agreement between A-1 and LCM, an entity described as a subsidiary of
the tribe. 9 In the tribal court, the plaintiffs tendered no evidence ad-
dressing the impacts of the contract or the accident on the tribe itself or
whether Stockert was acting under the subcontract.
Tribal Court Judge William Strate denied the motion to dismiss. 10
The tribal court judge determined that the court had authority to adjudi-
cate the case relying primarily on the concept of inherent sovereignty
and the presumption of civil jurisdiction. In support of this conclusion,
6. Strate v. A-I Contractors, 117 S. Ct. 1404, 1408 (1997).
7. See generally Joint Appendix at 5-10, Strate v. A-I Contractors, 117 S. Ct. 1404, 1408 (1997)
(No. 95-1872).
8. Although the parties challenged both personal and subject matter jurisdiction, the primary issue
raised throughout the tribal and federal court process focused on subject matter jurisdiction.
Unfortunately, tribal courts, federal courts, and commentators regularly confuse the two issues when
examining tribal jurisdiction questions.
9. Interestingly, that contract had forum selection and choice of law provisions selecting Utah
state courts and Utah law for dispute resolutions.
10. Joint Appendix at 19-25, Strate (No. 95-1872).
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the judge cited Iowa Mutual Insurance Company v. LaPlantell and
National Farmers Union Insurance Companies v. Crow Tribe.12 The tri-
bal judge also specifically noted that the "[diefendants have entered
upon and transacted business within the territorial boundaries of the
Reservation." 13 Presumably, this statement was in reference to Stock-
ert's subcontract with LCM to assist in building the tribal community
building.
Stockert and A-1 appealed the tribal court decision to the Northern
Plains Intertribal Court of Appeals. The Intertribal Court of Appeals
affirmed the tribal court's ruling that the tribal court had personal and
subject matter jurisdiction to hear the action. 14 Thereafter, pursuant to
the parties' stipulation,15 the tribal court dismissed the insurer from the
suit. 16
Before tribal court proceedings could resume, Stockert and A-1
brought an action in the United States District Court, for the District of
North Dakota, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief against the tribal
judge, the tribal court, and the plaintiffs. 17 The parties filed cross
motions for summary judgment on the issue of whether the tribal court
had jurisdiction. Relying primarily on National Farmers Union and
Iowa Mutual, the district court determined that the tribal court had civil
jurisdiction over the Fredericks' complaint against A-1 and Stockert;
accordingly, the district court dismissed the action. 18
Stockert and A-1 appealed from the district court's order of judg-
ment to the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals. On appeal, a divided panel
11. 480 U.S. 9(1987).
12. 471 U.S. 845 (1985).
13. Joint Appendix at 23, Strate (No. 95-1872). The Court indicated that this meant that the
defendants had entered into a consensual relationship with the Tribe and its members, which under
Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544 (1981) would also support the conclusion that jurisdiction of
the tribal court was appropriate. Id. Montana, as will be discussed in more detail later, indicated that
tribes were divested of jurisdiction over non-Indians unless the non-Indian had entered into a
consensual relationship with the tribe or the incident directly affected the tribe's political integrity,
economic security, or health or welfare.
14. Joint Appendix at 26-37, Strate (No. 95-1872). The appellate court also concluded that the
tribal court, pursuant to Iowa Mut. Ins. Co. v. LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9 (1987) and National Farmers Union
Ins. Co. v. Crow Tribe, 471 U.S. 845 (1995), presumptively had jurisdiction since the accident occurred
on the reservation. In response to the defendants arguments, the court noted that the "fact that the
auto/truck collision occurred on a state highway does not in and of itself divest the tribal court of
jurisdiction." Joint Appendix at 35-36, Strate (No. 95-1872).
15. Joint Appendix at 38-39, Strate (No. 95-1872).
16. Id. at 40.
17. Id. at 41-45. While noting that they had sovereign immunity and thus were not subject to the
suit, the Tribal defendants waived immunity for the limited purpose of "remain[ing] in [the] action in
federal court to defend the claim for declaratory relief raised by plaintiffs regarding the issue of tribal
court civil jurisdiction . I.. " ld. at 49 (Tribal Defendants' Amended Answer).
18. Id. at 54-65 (Memorandum and Order). The court held that the "tribe has jurisdiction over
Stockert because he entered the reservation, and he committed an act which resulted in the accrual of
a tort action within the reservation." Id. at 63.
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of the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed.19
Judges Theodore McMillian and Floyd Gibson, again relying primarily
on National Farmers Union and Iowa Mutual, determined that the tribal
court had jurisdiction. The majority determined that the case was not
controlled by the Montana analytical framework since Montana was
limited to disputes arising on fee lands owned by non-Indians. 20 Judge
Hansen, in a lengthy and analytical dissent, concluded that the tribal
court would not have jurisdiction over A-1 and Stockert. 21 On Decem-
ber 12, 1994, Stockert and A-1 filed a Petition for Rehearing with
Suggestion for En Banc Disposition.22 A-1 argued that en banc disposi-
tion was appropriate based upon the fact that the panel's majority
decision misapprehended the law by artificially limiting the analytical
framework announced in Montana to disputes involving fee lands owned
by non-Indians. A-i suggested that the ruling failed to recognize the
implicit divestiture of tribal civil jurisdiction over nonmembers, absent a
showing of a tribal interest, which results from the dependent status of
Indian tribes.23
Stockert and A-1 pointed out that the majority panel's decision
contradicted Duncan Energy Co. v. Three Affiliated Tribes of the Fort
Berthold Reservation.24 Duncan Energy involved a dispute regarding
the propriety of the tribe's imposition of a one-percent tax on real and
personal property within the reservation. In Duncan Energy, the appel-
lees failed to exhaust tribal remedies prior to seeking the intervention of
the federal court. Duncan Energy argued that they were not required to
exhaust their tribal court remedies pursuant to the Supreme Court's
holding in National Farmers Union and Iowa Mutual since those cases
did not specifically involve fee land disputes. A-1 pointed out that the
Eighth Circuit had held:
Duncan Energy contends that National Farmers Union and
Iowa Mutual are inapplicable to cases involving fee lands. We
find such a limited reading of those cases to be inappropriate;
nothing in the broad language employed by the Supreme
Court indicates that the reasoning in Iowa Mutual and National
Farmers Union applies only to similar factual situations.25
19. Id. at 68-90.
20. Id. at 77.
21. Id. at 81-90.
22. See, e.g., FED. R. App. P. 40; 8TH Cm. R. 35A.
23. Cf. Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 564 (1981).
24. 27 F.3d 1294 (8th Cir. 1994).
25. Duncan Energy Co. v. Three Affiliated Tribes of the Fort Berthold Reservation, 27 F.3d
1294, 1300 (8th Cir. 1994).
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In arguing for rehearing, A-1 suggested that the court in Duncan
Energy correctly held that the broad language of Iowa Mutual and
National Farmers Union requiring exhaustion of tribal court remedies,
was not limited to the exact factual scenarios presented. A-1 argued that
the same rule must be applied in its case. Thus, since there was nothing
in the broad language employed by the Supreme Court in Montana
which would indicate that the concept of limited sovereignty and accom-
panying divestiture of general civil jurisdiction over matters which do
not affect a tribal interest should be limited to similar factual situations,
the panel's restrictive ruling was in conflict with both Montana and
Duncan Energy.
The Eighth Circuit granted rehearing on January 9, 1995, and
vacated the previous panel decision.2 6 Oral argument before the en banc
panel was set for May 23, 1995, in St. Louis Missouri.2 7 On February
16, 1996, in an 8 to 4 decision the Eighth Circuit, sitting en banc, re-
versed the District Court's judgment. 28 The court of appeals concluded
that the controlling precedent for analysis of civil jurisdiction over
nonmembers was Montana v. United States, rather than National
Farmers Union and Iowa Mutual.
In particular, the court noted that:
The appellees fail to recognize the fact that Montana specifi-
cally extended the general principles underlying Oliphant to
civil jurisdiction. ("Though Oliphant only determined inher-
ent tribal authority in criminal matters, the principles on which
it relied support the general proposition that the inherent
sovereign powers of an Indian tribe do not extend to the
activities of nonmembers of the tribe"). Montana did not
extend the full Oliphant rationale to the civil jurisdiction
question-which would have completely prohibited civil
jurisdiction over nonmembers. Instead, the Court found that
the tribe retained some civil jurisdiction over nonmembers,
which the Court went on to describe in the Montana excep-
26. The order was entered by the Clerk, U.S. Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit, at the direction of
the Court.
27. The panel consisted of Richard S. Arnold, Chief Judge (Little Rock, Arkansas), Theodore
McMillian (St. Louis, Missouri), George G. Fagg (Des Moines, Iowa), Pasco M. Bowman (Kansas
City, Missouri), Roger L. Wollman (Sioux Falls, South Dakota), Frank J. Magill (Fargo, North Dakota),
C. Arlen Beam (Lincoln, Nebraska), James B. Loken (St. Paul, Minnesota), David R. Hansen (Cedar
Rapids, Iowa), Morris S. Arnold (Litlle Rock, Arkansas), Diane Murphy (Minneapolis, Minnesota),
and Floyd R. Gibson, Senior Judge (Kansas City, Missouri).
28. A-I Contractors v. Strate, 76 F.3d 930 (8th Cir. 1996) (en banc). Judge Hansen wrote the
majority opinion and was joined by R. Arnold, Fagg, Bowman, Wollman, Magill, Loken, and M.
Arnold. Judges Beam, F. Gibson, McMillian, and Murphy concurred and dissented, with all but Judge
Murphy writing separately.
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tions. Thus, when National Farmers Union states that civil
tribal jurisdiction over nonmembers is not foreclosed by
Oliphant, that observation is perfectly consistent with Montana,
which provides for broader tribal jurisdiction over non-Indians
than does Oliphant. Under Montana, the tribe has the ability
to exercise civil jurisdiction over non-Indians when tribal
interests [as defined in the Montana exceptions] are involved.29
The court then soundly rejected the appellees argument that Mon-
tana only applies to a tribes ability to exercise authority over a
non-Indian's conduct on non-Indian fee lands. The court examined
Montana and Brendale v. Confederated Tribes and Bands of the Yakima
Indian Nation30 and concluded that the broad and unqualified language
outlining the limitations on tribal power and authority was not restricted
to issues evolving on fee lands. 31 Based on those facts, the court deter-
mined that "any attempt to limit the rationale of Montana and Brendale
to fee land jurisdictional issues is both uncompelling and unsupported
by the language of those two cases." 32 Thus, in order for any tribal
court to properly be able to exercise jurisdiction over a non-Indian one
of the Montana exceptions would have to be satisfied, demonstrating a
sufficient tribal interest.
The appellees had also argued that Montana and its progeny only
addressed a tribe's regulatory power over non-Indians, and Iowa Mutual
and its progeny addressed tribal adjudicatory power over non-Indians.
Thus, appellees' argued that Montana and its rule of general divestiture
of tribal jurisdiction absent a tribal interest did not apply to the case.
Instead, Iowa Mutual's rule of presumed jurisdiction controlled as it was
a case involving adjudicatory power.
The panel noted that a regulatory/adjudicatory distinction "does
not appear explicitly, or even implicitly, anywhere in the case law." 33
Moreover, the court noted that "any attempt to create or apply a distinc-
tion between regulatory jurisdiction and adjudicatory jurisdiction in this
case would be illusory." 34 This is because the tribal court would have
the power to decide what substantive law applied. Therefore, the tribal
court would be defining the relationship and duties between parties on
reservation roads. Thus, while adjudicating the case it would, in essence,
29. A-I Contractors v. Strate, 76 F.3d 930, 937 (8th Cir. 1996).
30. 492 U.S. 408 (1989).
31. A-] Contractors, 76 F.3d at 937-38.
32. Id. at 937.
33. Id. at 938.
34. Id. While recognizing that some commentaries have suggested a distinction between
regulatory and adjudicatory jurisdiction, the panel indicated that the case law did not support such a
distinction. Id.
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be regulating the conduct of drivers on the highways on the
reservation. 35
After rejecting the appellees attempt to distinguish or limit Montana
the court examined whether either of the Montana exceptions had been
satisfied in the case. In other words, whether there was a sufficient tribal
interest in the matter.
The appellees argued that the first Montana exception, a consensual
relationship, was satisfied since A-1 had entered into a contract with the
tribe to perform work on the reservation and the accident occurred while
performing the work. The court recognized that the dispute before it,
"an ordinary run-of-the-mill automobile accident," 36 did not arise
under the terms of the contract, Fredericks was not a party to the subcon-
tract, and the tribe was not involved in the accident. 37 The court con-
cluded that there was no consensual relationship sufficient to satisfy the
first Montana exception. 38
In an attempt to demonstrate a direct effect on tribal political
integrity, part of the second Montana exception, the tribes asserted that
the ability to hear the case and function as a fully sovereign government
satisfied the requirement. A-1 took the position that such a broad
reading of the second exception would completely swallow up the
general rule. In reiterating that the tribes were limited sovereigns the
court stated that the "desire to assert and protect excessively claimed
sovereignty is not a satisfactory tribal interest within the meaning of the
second Montana exception." 39
The court read all of the cases together and came up with one
comprehensive and integrated rule:
a valid tribal interest must be at issue before a tribal court may
exercise civil jurisdiction over a non-Indian or nonmember, but
once the tribal interest is established, a presumption arises that
tribal courts have jurisdiction over the non-Indian or nonmem-
ber unless that jurisdiction is affirmatively limited by federal
law.40
On May 16, 1996, the tribal appellants filed a petition for a writ of
certiorari with the United State Supreme Court. In seeking a writ of
certiorari, the tribe argued that the en banc decision misconstrued and
35. Id.
36. Id. at 940.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id. The court went on to note that the Montana second exception clearly requires an impact
on the tribe itself, not a nonmember.
40. Id. at 939.
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misapplied Montana to the case at hand. The tribe also argued that the
en banc decision was in conflict with Hinshaw v. Mahler,41 a then recent
Ninth Circuit decision. In Hinshaw, Christian Mahler was killed when a
car being driven by Lynette Hinshaw struck the motorcycle he was
driving. Mahler was not an enrolled member of the Confederated Salish
and Kootenai Tribes of the Flathead Reservation although he did reside
on the reservation with his parents, Gloria and Kenneth Mahler. Hinshaw
was not an enrolled member of the tribes but she resided on the reserva-
tion. Gloria Mahler, Christian's mother, was an enrolled member of the
tribes.
Gloria and Kenneth Mahler filed an action for damages against
Hinshaw in the tribal court. Hinshaw appeared specially to contest
jurisdiction. "The tribal court denied her motion to dismiss, and found
jurisdiction because the accident occurred on the reservation and Gloria
Mahler was an enrolled member of the Tribes."42 Hinshaw appealed to
the tribal appellate court, which affirmed the tribal court's decision.
The Ninth Circuit addressed the jurisdiction of the tribal court over
the action. The court specifically noted that Hinshaw's actions injured
Gloria Mahler, a tribal member.4 3 Based upon this factual distinction,
A-i argued that certiorari was not appropriate since Gisela Fredericks
was not an enrolled member of the Three Affiliated Tribes. Therefore,
the en banc decision was not in direct conflict with Hinshaw.44 The
United States Supreme Court granted the tribes' petition for writ of
certiorari and ordered an expedited briefing schedule.4 5
IV. THE ARGUMENTS AND ISSUES AS PRESENTED TO THE
SUPREME COURT
In order to fully analyze the Strate decision, a detailed analysis of
the issues, as presented, is necessary. The tribes, along with their amici
curiae,4 6 including the United States, argued that the Montana analytical
41. 42 F.3d 1178 (9th Cir. 1994).
42. Hinshaw v. Mahler, 42 F.3d 1178, 1180 (9th Cir. 1994).
43. Id.
44. Despite A-i's argument, a comparison of the holdings in A-i Contractors and Hinshaw
suggested a conflict among the circuits.
45. A-I Contractors v. Strate, 76 F.3d 930 (8th Cir. 1996), cert. granted, 518 U.S. 1056 (Oct. 1,
1996) (No. 95-1872).
46. Several amicus briefs were filed in support of the tribe's position. These included amici
briefs from the United States by the Solicitor General; a brief by the Northern Plains Tribal Judges
Association; a brief by the Assiniboine and Sioux Tribes of the Fort Peck Reservation, the Confed-
erated Tribes of the Colville Reservation, the Ho-Chunk Nation, the St. Croix Band of Chippewa
Indians, and the Standing Rock Sioux Tribe; a brief by the Shakopee Mdewakanton Sioux (Dakota)
Community, Sisseton-Wahpeton Sioux Tribe, Spirit Lake Sioux Tribe and the Red Lake Band of
Chippewa; and a brief by the Yavapai-Apache Nation, Shoshone Tribe of the Wind River Indian
Reservation, and Lummi Nation.
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framework did not govern this case. The tribal petitioners maintained
that the controlling precedents were National Farmers Union and Iowa
Mutual and that those decisions established a rule of presumptive juris-
diction absent congressional action. The tribal petitioners also argued
that the Montana rule, which stated that absent express authorization by
federal statue or treaty, tribal jurisdiction over nonmembers existed only
in limited circumstances, related solely to regulatory authority and not
adjudicatory authority in disputes arising within a reservation. The tribal
petitioners alternatively suggested that the Montana analysis does not
apply to lands owned by, or held in trust for, a tribe or its members.
Thus, they argued that the Montana analysis only would apply with
respect to alienated reservation land owned in fee simple by non-Indians.
The respondents, Stockert and A-i, also supported by several
amicus briefs, 47 argued that the sovereignty retained by Indian tribes did
not include the power to exercise civil jurisdiction over actions between
nonmembers. Thus, A-1 argued for a broad based ruling determining
that tribal courts do not have jurisdiction over nonmembers at all.
Alternatively, A-i argued that even if the tribal courts had not been
generally divested of all civil jurisdiction over nonmembers, absent
compliance with the Montana exceptions, the tribal court still lacked
subject matter jurisdiction in this particular case since the federal right of
way, granted by the Secretary of the Interior pursuant to the General
Right of Way Act of 1948,48 divested the tribes of civil jurisdiction over
the activities of nonmembers on the highway in question. A-1 argued
that the right of way grant, which opened the highway to the general
public, divested the tribe of any authority to exclude or regulate the
conduct of nonmembers on the state highway, thus divesting the tribal
court of jurisdiction for activities occurring on the highway.
A-1 argued that the Montana analytical framework applied to all
lands where a tribe had been divested of the power to exclude
non-Indians. A-i noted that while both Montana and Brendale involved
questions of tribal authority over non-Indians on non-Indian owned fee
lands, neither case in any way limited its discussion, rationale, or holding
to issues arising on fee lands. Instead, Montana specifically found,
47. Several amici briefs were filed in support of A-I and its position. These included a brief
submitted by 14 states including Montana, Arizona, California, Colorado, Idaho, Massachusetts,
Mississippi, Nevada, New York, South Dakota, Utah, Washington, Wisconsin and Wyoming; a brief
by the American Trucking Associations, Inc., the American Automobile Association, and the
Burlington Northern Railroad Company; a brief by the Council of State Governments, National
Conference of State Legislatures, National Governors' Association, National Association of Counties,
U.S. Conference of Mayors, International City/County Management Association, and the National
League of Cities; and a brief by Lake County, Montana, and Flathead Joint Board of Control of the
Mission, Flathead, and Jocko Valley Irrigation Districts.
48. 25 U.S.C. § 323 (1994).
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without qualification or caveat, that tribal power itself is limited to what is
necessary to protect tribal self government and to control internal
relations, absent express congressional delegation of more expansive
authority. 49 Furthermore, Montana specifically addressed the "forms of
civil jurisdiction over non-Indians on their reservations" and outlined
the two limited situations wherein that jurisdiction may apply.50 A-1
argued that the Court did not limit its rationale to cases arising on
non-Indian fee lands but was referring broadly to tribal power over
nonmembers. A-1 suggested that the en banc decision correctly noted
that "any attempt to limit the rationale of Montana and Brendale to fee
land jurisdictional issues is both uncompelling and unsupported by the
language of those two cases."51
In support of its argument that the Montana analysis should apply
to the case, A-1 outlined in detail the nature of the Federal easement.
The accident underlying the case occurred on North Dakota Highway 8
within a grant of easement for right-of-way dated May 8, 1970, issued
by the Secretary of the Interior pursuant to the General Right-of-Way
Act of 194852 and its implementing regulations. 53 The only specific
rights reserved to the Indian landowners were outlined in the easement:
the right is reserved to the Indian landowners, their lessees,
successors, and assigns to construct crossings of the right-of-
way at all points reasonably necessary to the undisturbed use
and occupany[sic] of the premises affected by the right-of-
way; such crossing to be constructed and maintained by the
owners or lawful occupants and users of said lands at their own
risk and said occupants and users to assume full responsibility
for avoiding, or repairing any damage to the right-of-way
which may be occasioned by such crossing.
The tribes reserved no other right to exercise any dominion or
control over the right-of-way in consenting to the grant by the Secretary.
49. Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 564 (1981).
50. Id. at 565-66.
51. Joint Appendix at 106; Strate (1997) (No. 95-1872) (quotingA-1 Contractors, 76 F.3d at 938).
52. 25 U.S.C. §§ 323-28 (1988).
53. In 1948, Congress enacted a comprehensive, general purpose right of way statute which dele-
gates to the Secretary, not to tribes, the right to grant rights-of-way for all purposes over and across
tribal trust lands. See, e.g., Act of Feb. 5, 1948, ch. 45, §§ 1-6, 62 Stat. 17-18 (codified at 25 U.S.C. §§
323-328 (1994)); Fredericks v. Mandel, 650 F.2d 144, 147 (8th Cir. 1981) (holding that the Fort
Berthold Reservation tribal court had no jurisdiction to grant a right of way or easement over trust
lands with the Fort Berthold Reservation). While § 324 requires consent of the tribe, the right-of-way
grantor is the United States. Section 325 prohibits the grant of fights-of-way without the payment of
just compensation. Loring v. United States, 610 F.2d 649, 650 (9th Cir. 1979). These consent and
compensation provisions are triggered because the tribe's right of occupancy is to be extinguished.
See generally Oneida Indian Nation v. County of Oneida, 414 U.S. 661, 667 (1974).
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Thus, A-1 argued the grant of easement for right-of-way divested the
tribes of any and all rights, duties or control over North Dakota State
Highway No. 8, except those narrow interests specifically reserved.
In deciding whether an accident which occurred on a U.S. highway
within the boundaries of an Indian reservation supported tribal court
jurisdiction, the district court in Swift Transp., Inc. v. John,54 examined
the 1948 Rights-of-Way Act, the same statutory scheme under which the
right-of-way underlying Highway 8 was granted. The Swift court noted
that "[iut is well established that Indian title is 'only a right of occupan-
cy ...extinguishable only by the United States."' 55 After noting that
an intent to extinguish Indian property rights is not lightly imputed to
Congress and requires a clear expression of congressional intent, the
court in Swift held that there was "just such a clear expression of con-
gressional intent to extinguish Indian title in rights-of-way such as U.S.
Highway 89."56
In 1948, Congress enacted the Indian Rights-of-Way Act, which
empowers the Secretary of the Interior to grant rights-of-way for all
purposes over Indian lands. The right-of-way for U.S. Highway 89 was
established pursuant to this statute. Before granting a right-of-way the
Secretary must obtain the consent of the landowner under most circum-
stances. Plaintiffs assert without contradiction that consent was obtained
in this case. Moreover, § 325 and 25 C.F.R. § 161.12 prohibit the grant
of rights-of-way without the payment of just compensation. These
compensation and consent revisions plainly indicate that Congress
envisioned that Indian interest in the land affected would be extin-
guished. It is axiomatic that designating these lands as a U.S. Highway
open to the general public is wholly inconsistent with an intent to allow
the continued right of Indian occupancy. Accordingly, the Court
concluded that the status of U.S. Highway 89 is equivalent to that of the
non-Indian fee land in Montana.57
A-1 pointed out that in its case all statutory requirements were met
in granting the easement to the State of North Dakota, including just
compensation pursuant to the 1948 Act. 58 As in Swift, the compensation
and consent provisions "plainly indicate that Congress envisioned that
Indian interest in the land affected would be extinguished." 59
54. 546 F. Supp. 1185 (D. Ariz. 1982), vacatedas moot, 574 F. Supp. 710 (D. Ariz. 1983).
55. Swift Transp., Inc. v. John, 546 F. Supp. 1185, 1192 (D. Ariz. 1982) (citations omitted).
56. Id.
57. 25 U.S.C. §§ 323-28; 25 C.F.R. § 161.3 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
58. 25 U.S.C. § 325.
59. Id.; see also Wilson v. Marchington, 934 F. Supp. 1176, 1185 (D. Mont. 1995) (stating that "it
is beyond dispute that designating a right-of-way as a U.S. Highway with the concomitant unrestricted
access to the general public, abrogated any preexisting right to regulatory control" by the Indian
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The only specific rights reserved to the tribe and its members
involved the right to construct crossings of the right-of-way at all points
reasonably necessary. Tribal jurisdictional powers over reservation lands
"must be read in light of the subsequent alienation of those lands." 60
In South Dakota v. Bourland,61 the Court considered whether the
Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe could regulate hunting and fishing by
non-Indians on lands and overlying waters located within the tribe's
reservation but acquired by the United States for operation of the Oahe
Dam and Reservoir. The Cheyenne River Act reserved to the tribe the
use of the former reservation lands for minerals, grazing and access
rights, and for hunting and fishing. The Bourland Court recognized that
the taking from the Cheyenne River Sioux Reservation differed "from
the conveyances of fee title in Montana ... in that the terms of the
Cheyenne River Act preserve certain limited land-use rights belonging to
the tribe." 62
The Court then concluded that:
regardless of whether land is conveyed pursuant to an Act of
Congress for homesteading or for flood control purposes,
when Congress has broadly opened up such land to
non-Indians, the effect of the transfer is the destruction of
pre-existing Indian rights to regulatory control. Although
Montana involved lands conveyed in fee to non-Indians within
the Crow Reservation, Montana's framework for examining the
'effect of the land alienation' is applicable to the federal
takings in this case.63
A-1 argued that in its case, the easement the United States granted to
the State of North Dakota for Highway 8, pursuant to the Indian
Rights-Of-Way Act, completely opened up Highway 8 to the use and
occupancy of all. Indeed, A-i pointed out that the 6.59 mile stretch of
road is utilized to access the shores of Lake Sakakawea, a federally
created water resource project. Anyone who seeks to enjoy the
recreational activities and facilities located on Lake Sakakawea, which
was created and is maintained by the Army Corps of Engineers pursuant
to the Flood Control Act of 1944, may utilize the road. Since "Con-
tribe). The district court, in Marchington, after undertaking a detailed analysis of why civil jurisdiction
should not rest with the tribe, ultimately concluded that the court "constrained by the doctrine of stare
decisis, is bound to follow the holding of Hinshaw v. Mahler, 42 F.3d 1178 (9th Cir. 1994) despite the
court's misgiving regarding the reasoning employed therein and the result dictated in the present
action." Marchington, 934 F. Supp. at 1187. Ultimately the trial court's analllysis was accepted by the
Ninth Circuit. See infra notes 137-150.
60. South Dakota v. Bourland, 508 U.S. 679, 697 (1993) (citing Montana v. United States, 450
U.S. 544, 561 (1981) (referring to Puyallup Tribe v. Washington Game Dept., 433 U.S. 165 (1977))).
61. 508 U.S. 679, 681-82 (1993).
62. South Dakota v. Bourland, 508 U.S. 679, 692-93 (1993).
63. Id. at 692 (footnote omitted) (emphasis added).
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gress has broadly opened up such land to non-Indians, the effect of the
transfer is the destruction of pre-existing Indian rights to regulatory
control."64
Thus, the stage was set. The tribal petitioners argued that National
Farmers Union and Iowa Mutual created presumptive tribal civil juris-
diction over non-Indians. The tribal petitioners argued that Montana
did not govern the case because the land underlying the scene of the
accident was held in trust for the Three Affiliated Tribes. Tribal peti-
tioners also attempted to create a distinction between adjudicatory and
regulatory jurisdiction.
A-i's counterargument was that National Farmers Union and Iowa
Mutual were simply exhaustion cases and did not outline a rule of
presumptive civil jurisdiction. In addition, A-1 asserted that the Mon-
tana analytical framework controlled the case since the tribes had lost
the power to regulate or exclude non-Indians from the highway in
question. Lastly, A-1 argued there was no factual or legal basis to draw a
distinction between adjudicatory and regulatory jurisdiction.
The case was argued to the Court on January 7, 1997.65 The
Court's questioning during oral arguments provided insight into its
analysis and concerns. The Court was concerned with several particular
areas. First, the Court asked several questions regarding the practical
aspects of which entity controlled the highway, including speed and
regulation of driver's conduct. 66 The Court also asked about "specula-
tion about due process horribles." 67 In particular, the Court inquired
regarding information about any documented examples of due process
concerns arising out of tribal court proceedings. The Court was
specifically concerned with alleged due process violations in a recent
Ninth Circuit decision. 68 The Court also inquired, perhaps in light of its
64. Id.
65. A transcript of the oral argument can be viewed at 1997 WL 10398. Melody L. McCoy
argued the case on behalf of the tribal petitioners. Ms. McCoy works with the Native American Rights
Fund in Boulder, Colorado. Jonathan E. Nuechterlein, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department
of Justice, Washington, D.C., argued on behalf of the United States as amicus curiae in support of the
tribal petitioners. Patrick J. Ward, a partner with Zuger Kirmis & Smith, Bismarck, North Dakota,
argued on behalf of A-i Contractors and Lyle Stockert.
66. Strate v. A-1 Contractors, No. 95-1872, 1997 WL 10398 at *4-*8 (U.S. Jan. 7, 1991).
67. Id. at *41-*42.
68. Id. at *42-*43. See Burlington Northern R.R. Co. v. Estate of Red Wolf, 106 F.3d 868 (9th
Cir. 1996), vacated, 118 S. Ct. 37 (1997). The Red Wolf case outlined significant due process con-
cers. In 1995, Burlington Northern was sued in tribal court on the Crow Reservation in Montana by
the survivors of two members of the tribe killed in a railroad crossing accident on the reservation. In
1996, the case was tried to a jury made up entirely of members of the tribe, including some relatives of
the plaintiffs. During jury selection, many potential jurors expressed a deep seated bias against the rail-
road. That bias was echoed by the court itself when a tribal judge, who was not presiding over the
case, addressed the venire panel in the Crow language, telling them, "A train runs through the middle
of our land, Crows, you know, I don't have to tell you. Bodies, in the past, bodies are scattered along
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discussion regarding due process concerns, about post trial review of
tribal court decisions in the federal court system. 69 The Court clearly
expressed skepticism as to whether an adjudicatory/regulatory
jurisdictional distinction could exist. 70 It is with these questions and
concerns in mind that the Court took the matter under advisement.
V. THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT DECISION IN
STRATE V. A-i CONTRACTORS
On April 28, 1997, the Court issued its decision in Strate v. A-i.
The Court opened its opinion by unequivocally stating that the case
law established that "absent express authorization by federal statute or
treaty, tribal jurisdiction over the conduct of nonmembers exists only
in limited circumstances." 71 The Court noted that in Oliphant v. Su-
quamish Tribe,72 it had held that Indian tribes lacked criminal juris-
diction over non-Indians. The Court then noted that Montana, decided
three years later, is the "path marking case" concerning tribal civil
authority of nonmembers. 73 After analyzing the Montana decision, the
Court noted:
Montana thus described a general rule that, absent a different
congressional direction, Indian tribes lack civil authority over
the conduct of nonmembers on, non-Indian land within a
reservation, subject to exceptions: The first exception relates to
nonmembers who enter consensual relationships with the tribe
or its members; the second concerns activity that directly
affects the tribe's political integrity, economic security, health,
or welfare. 74
As noted above, the tribal petitioners and the United States as amici
curiae argued that Montana did not control this case. The tribe asserted
the railway. Now, this is the day." Although the evidence showed that the driver and her mother
were intoxicated at the time of the accident, the jury found Burlington Northern 100% liable for
wrongful death and awarded the five heirs what the jury described as "compensatory" damages in the
astonishing amount of $250 million.
69. Strate, 1997 WL 10398, at *42-*43. A-1 pointed out that the Supreme Court's decisions left
unresolved whether federal courts may review tribal court's deprivation of fundamental equal
protection and due process rights under the Indian Civil Rights Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1303 (1988).
See Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49 (1978). For one writer's view on federal court
review of tribal court decisions, see Judith V. Royster, Stature and Scrutiny: Post- Exhaustion Review
of Tribal Court Decisions, 46 KAN. L. REV. 241 (1998).
70. Strate, 1997 WL 10398, at *17-*18.
71. Strate v. A- 1 Contractors, 117 S. Ct. 1404, 1409 (1997) (emphasis added); see also Montana
v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 565 (1981); Hornell Brewing Co. v. Rosebud Sioux Tribal Court, 133
F.3d 1087, 1091 (8th Cir. 1998); County of Lewis v. Allen, 141 F.3d 1385, 1388-90, 1392 (9th Cir.
1998); Burlington Northern R.R. Co. v. Estate of Red Wolf, No. CV 96-000-BLG-JDS, slip op. at 9 (D.
Mont. April 9, 1997).
72. 435 U.S. 191 (1978).
73. Strate, 117 S. Ct. at 1409.
74. Id. at 1409-10.
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that Montana was limited to issues regarding regulatory authority and
not adjudicatory authority in disputes occurring within a reservation.
Instead, the tribe argued that National Farmers Union and Iowa Mutual
created a presumptive rule of civil jurisdiction over nonmembers. In
addressing this argument, the Supreme Court indicated "we read our
precedent differently."75 The Court concluded that both decisions
simply described an exhaustion rule allowing tribal courts initially to
respond to an invocation of their jurisdiction; and neither established
any specific tribal court adjudicatory authority in general, or even over
the lawsuits involved in those cases. 76 Recognizing that its precedent had
been "variously interpreted," 77 the Court undertook an extensive
analysis of its decision in National Farmers Union and Iowa Mutual.
The Court then reiterated that "National Farmers Union and Iowa
Mutual enunciate only an exhaustion requirement, a 'prudential rule,'
based on comity." 78
The Court also dismissed the-tribal petitioners' argument suggesting
a distinction between adjudicating and regulatory jurisdiction. Although
the tribe had argued vehemently that Montana only related to regulatory
control, the Court unequivocally held:
As to nonmembers, we hold, a tribe's adjudicative jurisdiction
does not exceed its legislative jurisdiction. Absent congres-
sional direction enlarging tribal-court jurisdiction, we adhere to
that understanding. Subject to controlling provisions in treaties
and statutes, and the two exceptions identified in Montana, the
civil authority of Indian tribes and their courts with respect to
non-Indian fee lands generally 'do[es] not extend the activities
of nonmembers of the tribe.' 79
The tribal petitioners had alternatively argued that the Montana
analysis did not govern the case because the land underlying the scene
of the accident was being held in trust for the Three Affiliated Tribes
and their members. In response, Stockert and A-1 had argued that while
both Montana and Brendale involved questions of tribal authority over
non-Indians on non-Indian owned fee lands, neither case limited its
75. Id. at 1410.
76. Id. (citing Brendale v. Confederated Tribes and Bands of the Yakima Nation, 493 U.S. 408
(1989)).
77. Id. at 1412.
78. Id.
79. Id. (citing Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 565 (1981)) (emphasis added). Despite
the court's unequivocal ruling, commentaries continue to advance arguments for a distinction between
adjudicatory and regulatory authority. See Jamelle King, Tribal Court General Civil Jurisdiction Over
Actions Between Non-Indian Plaintiffs and Defendants: Strate v. A-I Contractors, 22 AM. INDIAN L.
REV. 191 (1997).
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discussion, rationale or holding to issues solely arising on fee lands.
Instead, A-1 argued that Montana specifically found, without qualifica-
tion, that tribal power itself is limited to what is necessary to protect tribal
self-government and to control internal relations, absent express congres-
sional delegation of more expansive authority. 80 Furthermore, A-i
argued that Montana specifically addressed the "forms of civil jurisdic-
tion over non-Indians on their reservations" and outlined the two limited
situations in which that jurisdiction could apply. 81 In Montana, the
Court did not limit its rationale to cases arising on non-Indian fee lands
but referred broadly to tribal power over nonmembers.
In Strate, the Court noted that the action underlying the case
occurred on North Dakota Highway 8 within a grant of easement for
right of way dated May 8, 1970, issued by the Secretary of the Interior
pursuant to the general right-of-way act of 1948, at 25 U.S.C. § 323-28
and its implementing regulations. 82 The only specific rights reserved to
the Indian landowners were outlined in the easement itself and did not
include the right to control the highway or exclude non-Indians.8 3
The Court noted that the right of way opened up the state highway
to the public and that traffic on it was subject to the state's control. 84
Importantly, the Court held so long as the stretch is maintained as part of
the state's highway, the tribes cannot assert a landowner's right to
occupy and exclude. "We therefore align the right of way, for the
purpose at hand, with land alienated to non-Indians. Our decision in
Montana, accordingly, governs this case." 85 Thus, it is apparent, that
regardless of the purpose of the alienation, if a tribe loses its "gate
keeping right" and its concomitant power to exclude, it also loses
jurisdiction, absent compliance with one of the Montana exceptions. 86
Having rejected the tribal petitioner's arguments and attempts to distin-
guish Montana, the Court then had to apply the Montana exceptions to
see if jurisdiction was appropriate.
After concluding that the Montana analytical framework controlled
the analysis, and after noting that no treaty or federal statute specifically
80. See Montana, 450 U.S. at 564.
8 1. See id. at 565.
82. See supra note 53.
83. Strate, 117 S. Ct. at 1414. The tribes reserved no other right to exercise any dominion or
control over the right of way in consenting to the grant by the secretary.
84. Id. One of the Court's first questions during oral argument related to who controlled the
highway. See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
85. Strate, 117 S. Ct at 1414 (citations omitted).
86. Id. at 1407 (stating that "we express no view on the governing law or proper forum when an
accident occurs on a tribal road within a reservation."). The Court's reference was in its opening
paragraphs and was not inserted into the opinion along with the discussion regarding the status of the
land.
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authorized the Three Affiliated Tribes to entertain highway accident tort
suits, the Court undertook an application of the two Montana exceptions
to determine whether either had been satisfied. The first Montana
exception covers "activities of nonmembers who enter consensual
relationships with the tribe or its members, through commercial dealing,
contracts, leases, or other arrangements." 87  The Court noted that
although A-1 was clearly engaged in subcontract work on the Fort
Berthold Reservation, and therefore had a "consensual relationship"
with the tribes, the action was distinctly nontribal in nature since "Gisela
Fredericks was not a party to the subcontract, and the tribes were
strangers to the accident." 88
In reviewing the scope of Montana's first exception, the Court was
guided by the cases Montana cited in support of that proposition. The
Court noted that the "list of cases" fitting within the first exception
indicates the type of activities the court had in mind. After outlining the
four cases, 89 the Court, in a terse one statement conclusion held that
"measured against these cases, the Fredericks/Stockert highway accident
presents no 'consensual relationship' of the qualifying kind."90
The Court, in indicating that Gisela Fredericks was not a party to the
subcontract and that the dispute was distinctly nontribal in nature,
narrowly defined the first Montana exception to include consensual
commercial relationships and disputes arising directly from those
relationships. Thus, it appears, torts, nonconsensual activities, will rarely,
if ever, fall within Montana's first exception unless arising directly from
the agreement or relationship. 91
The second exception to Montana's general rule that tribe's lack
jurisdiction over nonmembers relates to conduct that "threatens or has
some direct affect on the political integrity, the economic security, or the
health and welfare of the tribe."92 In analyzing this exception, the Court
87. Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 565 (1981).
88. Strate, 117 S. Ct. at 1415.
89. Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217 (1959) (declaring tribal jurisdiction exclusive over lawsuit aris-
ing out of on reservation sales transaction between nonmember plaintiff and member defendants);
Morris v. Hitchcock, 194 U.S. 384 (1904) (upholding tribal permit tax on nonmember-owned livestock
within boundaries of the Chickasa Nation); Buster v. Wright, 135 F. 947, 950 (8th Cir. 1905)
(upholding the tribe's permit tax on nonmembers for the privilege of conducting business within tribe's
borders. The Court characterized as "inherent" the tribe's "authority ... to prescribe the terms upon
which non-citizens may transact business within its borders." See Washington v. Confederated Tribes
of Colville Indian Reservation, 447 U.S. 134, 152-54 (1980) (tribal authority to tax on reservation
cigarette sales to nonmembers "is a fundamental attribute of sovereignty which the tribes retain unless
divested of it by federal law or necessary implication of their dependent status").
90. Strate, 117 S. Ct. at 1415.
91. Indeed, this concept of consent based jurisdiction appears to be the trend if not the reality.
See L. Scott Gould, The Consent Paradigm: Tribal Sovereignty at the Millennium, 96 COLUM. L. REV.
809 (1996).
92. Montana, 450 U.S. at 566.
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acknowledged "undoubtedly, those who drive carelessly on a public
highway running through a reservation endanger all in the vicinity and
surely jeopardize the safety of tribal members. But if Montana's second
exception requires no more, the exception would severely shrink the
rule." 93 In analyzing the scope of Montana's second exception, the
Court again indicated that the cases cited in Montana to support the
exception indicate the character of the tribal interest the Court envi-
sioned. In examining these cases, the Court noted:
The Court referred first to the decision recognizing the
exclusive competence of a tribal court over an adoption
proceeding when all parties belong to the Tribe and resided on
its reservation. Next, the Court listed a decision holding a tribal
court exclusively competent to adjudicate a claim by a
non-Indian merchant seeking payment from tribe members for
goods bought on credit at an on reservation store. Thereafter,
the Court referred to two decisions dealing with objections to a
county or territorial governmel~ts imposition of a property tax
on non-Indian-owned livestock that grazed on reservation land;
in neither case did the Court find a significant tribal interest at
stake. 94
After reviewing all of these cases, the Court was quick to note:
Read in isolation, the Montana rule second exception can be
misperceived. Key to its proper application, however, is the
Court's preface: 'Indian tribes retain their inherent power [to
punish tribal offenders] to determine tribal membership, to
regulate domestic relations among members, and to prescribe
rules of inheritance for members . . . But [a tribe's inherent
power does not reach] beyond what is necessary to protect
tribal self-government or to control internal relations.' 95
The Court concluded that neither regulatory nor adjudicatory authority
over North Dakota State Highway 8 was needed to preserve the right of
the Indians to either make their own laws or be ruled by them. Thus, the
93. Strate, 117 S. Ct. at 1415.
94. Id. at 1415, 424 U.S. at 386; see also Williams, 358 U.S. at 220 (stating that "absent governing
acts of Congress, the question of state court jurisdiction over and on reservation conduct and actually
have the question [of state court jurisdiction over on reservation conduct] has always been whether
the state action infringed on the right of reservation Indians to make their own laws and be ruled by
them."); Montana Catholic Missions v. Missoula County, 200 U.S. 118 (1906) (stating that "the Indians'
interest in this kind of property [livestock], situated on the reservation, was not sufficient to exempt
such property, when owned by private individuals, from [state or territorial] taxation"); Thomas v.
Gay, 169 U.S. 264, 273 (1898) (stating that "[territorial] tax put upon the cattle of [non-Indian] lessees
is too remote and indirect to be deemed a tax upon the lands or privileges of the Indians").
95. Id. at 1416 (citing Montana, 450 U.S. at 564) (emphasis added).
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Court held that the Montana rule, and not its exceptions, applied to the
case.
Perhaps the most significant aspect of the Strate decision lies in its
footnotes. In particular, footnote 14. Footnote 14 provides:
When, as in this case, it is plain that no federal grant provides
for tribal governance of nonmembers' conduct on land
covered by Montana's main rule, it will be equally evident that
tribal courts lack adjudicatory authority over disputes arising
from such conduct. As in criminal proceedings, state or
federal courts will be the only forums competent to adjudicate
those disputes. Therefore, when tribal-court jurisdiction over
an action such as this one is challenged in federal court, the
otherwise applicable exhaustion requirement must give way, for
it would serve no purpose other than delay.96
Prior to the Strate decision, exhaustion was mandated absent very
specific criteria. These criteria were announced in National Farmers
Union. They required exhaustion unless an assertion of tribal jurisdic-
tion was motivated by a desire to harass or in bad faith, or where the
action is patently violative of express jurisdictional prohibitations, or
where exhaustion would be futile because of a lack of an opportunity to
challenge the court's jurisdiction. 97 Previously, the courts had applied
this exhaustion requirement very strictly. 98
Strate changed all that. Footnote 14 now appears to both authorize
and approve federal court involvement in any case where it is plain that
no federal grant provides for tribal governance of nonmember conduct.
Thus, as a practical matter, litigants can, and in most cases will, seek
federal court intervention at a much earlier stage of litigation. 99 Foot-
note 14 is even more interesting in light of the fact that in Strate, A-i
had exhausted its remedies. Thus, the issue was not even directly before
the Court. Regardless, the Court took the opportunity to change the
scope of the rule, thus making it easier to obtain federal court review.
In order to put the decision and its impact on tribal jurisdiction in
context, a review of federal decisions applying the Strate analytical
framework is necessary.
96. Id. at 1416 n.14 (emphasis added). Cf. National Farmers Union Ins. Co. v. Crow Tribe, 471
U.S. 845, 856 n.21 (1995).
97. National Farmers Union, 471 U.S. at 856 n.21.
98. See, e.g., Duncan Energy Co., Inc. v. Three Affiliated Tribes of the Fort Berthold Reserva-
tion, 27 F.3d 1294, 1300 (8th Cir. 1994). For an in depth analysis of the exhaustion of tribal court
remedies see Phillip W. M. Lear and Blake D. Miller, Exhaustion of Tribal Court Remedies: Rejecting
Bright-Line Rules And Affirmative Action, 71 N.D. L. REV. 277 (1995).
99. See, e.g., Hornell Brewing Co. v. Rosebud Sioux Tribal Court, 133 F.3d 1087, 1092 (8th Cir.
1998).
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VI. SUBSEQUENT DECISIONS
At the time of the writing of this article, several courts have applied
the Strate decision. A brief review of some of those cases helps put the
decision in context. In perhaps the first reported decision to apply the
Strate analysis, the Mexico Court of Appeals issued its decision in
Halwood v. Cowboy Auto Sales, Inc. on May 20, 1997.100 Wilson
Halwood, Jr. and Loraina Halwood were enrolled members of the Navajo
Tribe.101
The Halwoods purchased a used car from Cowboy Auto Sales, Inc.
The Halwoods sued Cowboy Auto Sales, Inc. and the salesman who sold
them the car, Bruce Williams, after the defendants repossessed the car
from the plaintiffs' residence on the Navajo Reservation near Chinle,
Arizona, while the plaintiffs were not at home. 102 The Halwoods sued
the defendants for illegal repossession, trespass, and conversion. The
defendants, although properly served, failed to plead or answer the
complaint in any way. The plaintiffs' moved for default judgment and
after the defendants did not respond, the tribal court eventually entered a
default judgment in favor of the plaintiffs.
The tribal court judge granted the plaintiffs $5,000 in interest, costs,
and compensatory and statutory damages along with attorneys' fees.
The tribal court also granted $25,000 in punitive damages. In determin-
ing that civil jurisdiction was proper with the Navajo Nation, the court
analyzed the Strate decision. In particular, the defendants argued that
following Strate, civil jurisdiction no longer existed over them. The
court noted: "We disagree for two reasons. First, the court in Strate was
careful to emphasize that the land on which the incident in that case
arose was a state highway, and the court expressed no opinion on wheth-
er the same result would obtain if the incident arose on a tribal road
within the reservation." 103  The court also indicated that civil jurisdic-
tion over disputes arising out of consensual relationships with the tribal
members through commercial dealings and contracts presumptively lies
100. Halwood v. Cowboy Auto Sales, Inc., 946 P.2d 1088 (N.M. Ct. App. 1997).
101. Halwood, 946 P.2d at 1090. All of the factual background as presented to the Court of
Appeals of New Mexico came from the findings of fact and conclusions of law and judgment entered
by default by the District Court of the Navajo Nation, Chinle, Arizona, on January 27, 1992. Id.
102. Id. Cowboy Auto Sales, Inc. and Bruce Williams alleged to the Court of Appeals that the
repossession of the car took place in Gallup, New Mexico, while the plaintiffs were shopping and then
they drove the plaintiffs to their home on the reservation as a matter of courtesy. Id. at 1093. The
court noted that the defendants alleged this for the first time in almost-six years of litigation. In
particular, the court noted that "defendants allege these facts to the wrong court." Id.
103. Id. at 1092 (citing Strate v. A-I Contractors, 117 S. Ct. 1404, 1408 (1997)).
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in the tribal courts. 104 Thus, the court held that civil jurisdiction over the
defaulting defendants was appropriate.105
In Harrison v. Boyd Mississippi Inc.,10 6 a non-Indian employee
initiated an action for damages against the gaming management compa-
ny which was operating an Indian casino alleging battery, false detention,
and false imprisonment. A suit was initiated in state circuit court. The
circuit court dismissed the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
The circuit judge concluded that since the cause of action arose within
the boundaries of the tribal reservation of the Mississippi Band of
Choctaw Indians "substantial tribal interests are present in the controver-
sy and the sovereignty of the Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians must
be recognized by this court." 107
The Mississippi Supreme Court reversed the circuit court's ruling
finding that the tribal courts of the Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians
lacked subject matter jurisdiction. Harrison is important for several
reasons. First, the court specifically noted that all conduct which formed
the basis for the alleged torts, occurred in and on Choctaw Indian
country. Furthermore, neither the plaintiff nor any of the defendants
were members of the Choctaw Band. Even though the incidents oc-
curred on Indian country, the court applied the Montana analysis to
determine whether jurisdiction existed in tribal court. Thus, the court
appeared to answer the question which Strate left for another day, which
is whether the Montana analysis applied to activity occurring on Indian
Country. 108
Harrison is also important for its application of the Montana
exceptions. In Harrison, the court noted that the "case at bar concerns a
tort action, not a contract, lease or other arrangement."109 The court
noted that no consensual relationship existed between the plaintiff and
the Band of Choctaws or any of its members. As such, the court narrow-
ly applied the first Montana exception restricting consensual
relationships to issues arising directly from contracts, leases, or other
commercial arrangements.
104. Id. Therefore, the court appeared to read the Montana first exception in a relatively broad
fashion. Although there was a commercial transaction, the repossession itself (the tort) did not arise
directly from the contract.
105. Id. The court also concluded that the imposition of punitive damages was civil in nature and
thus the district court's decision to vacate the punitive damages award based on it being criminal in
nature pursuant to Oliphant v. Suquamish Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978) was incorrect.
106. 700 So. 2d 247 (Miss. 1997).
107. Harrison v. Boyd Mississippi, 700 So. 2d 247, 249 (Miss. 1997).
108. Id. at 251. In Sirate, the court indicated that it would leave for another day what the
outcome would be if the accident had occurred on a tribal road. 117 S. Ct. at 1408.
109. Harrison, 700 So. 2d at 251.
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In Kerr-McGee Corporation v. Farley,l"O members of the Navajo
Nation initiated suit in the Navajo Tribal Court seeking damages for
alleged negligence resulting in death arising out Kerr-McGee's opera-
tion of a uranium processing mill located on leased tribal land within the
reservation.Ill Kerr-McGee filed a declaratory judgment action in
federal district court seeking to enjoin the Navajo Tribal Court from
proceeding and to declare the tribal court lacked jurisdiction over the
claims. The Federal District Court of New Mexico stayed the proceed-
ings and ordered Kerr-McGee to exhaust its tribal remedies.
Kerr-McGee initiated an interlocutory appeal. The court of appeals
concluded that the tribal court's exercise of jurisdiction was not so
contrary to the federal law as to preclude application of the tribal ex-
haustion rule.
In determining whether exhaustion was appropriate or whether it
was patently violative of express jurisdictional prohibitations, 112 the court
examined the Strate case. After the Strate decision was issued, the 10th
Circuit requested supplementary briefs on its significance to the
Kerr-McGee case.11 3 The 10th Circuit noted:
In Strate the Supreme Court found that, absent a treaty or
statute, a tribe had jurisdiction to adjudicate a dispute between
nonmembers of the tribe arising out of an automobile accident
occurring on a state highway. Relying principally on Mon-
tana, the Court held that with respect to lands over which the
tribe had ceded sovereign authority, tribal jurisdiction is
substantially limited. After carefully reviewing Strate, we
concluded it is of limited usefulness in our case.
Kerr-McGee's alleged torts did not occur on lands over which
the tribe has ceded authority and control to another sovereign
for an indefinite period. Here, the lease was to a private entity
and for a finite period. The Supreme Court simply has not
spoken to such a situation.1 14
Thus, the court suggested that this was an exhaustion case and as
such, jurisdiction could be appropriate since the activity occurred on
tribal lands. Therefore, Kerr-McGee appeared to restrict the Strate
analysis to land which was the equivalent of non-Indian land.
110. 115 F.3d 1498 (10th Cir. 1997).
111. Kerr-McGee Corp. v. Farley, 115 F.3d 1498, 1500 (10th Cir. 1997).
112. See National Farmers Union Ins. Co. v. Crow Tribe, 471 U.S. 845, 856 n.21 (1985).
113. Kerr-McGee, 115 F.3d at 1506 n.4.
114. Id. (quoting Strate v. A-I Contractors, 117 S. Ct. 1404, 1408 (1997) (stating that "we express
no view on the governing law or proper forum when an accident occurs on a tribal road within a
reservation.")).
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In County of Lewis v. Allen, 115 the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals,
sitting en banc, addressed tribal jurisdiction in light of the Strate deci-
sion. Lewis County is a subdivision of the state of Idaho with much of
its territory located within the Nez Perce Indian Reservation.1 6 The Nez
Perce Tribe had consented to Idaho's assumption of concurrent criminal
jurisdiction within the boundaries of the reservation over several minor
offenses, including disturbing the peace. 1 17 John Allen and a woman
contacted the county sheriff's office in order to complain of a battery
perpetrated by a bartender.1 18 Deputy Sheriff Tom Myers proceeded to
the Allen house in order to interview the woman. Allen and his wife,
along with the other woman, had all been drinking together at the bar.
All three were intoxicated and continually kept interrupting Deputy
Myers as he attempted to interview the woman. Eventually, Deputy
Myers gave up. 119 As Deputy Myers was leaving Allen's residence,
Allen yelled obscenities and shook his fist at the deputy. 120 Eventually,
after providing warnings, Deputy Myers arrested Allen for disturbing the
peace. The criminal charge was dismissed after a jury trial.
Once the criminal case ended, Allen sued Deputy Myers and Lewis
County, among others, in the Nez Perce Tribal Court. Allen sued for
false arrest, assault and battery, false imprisonment, and malicious prose-
cution. 12 1 The case went to trial in the tribal court. The jury determined
that damages were attributed ten percent each to Mr. and Mrs. Allen,
forty-five percent to Deputy Myers, twenty-five percent to the Sheriff,
and ten percent to Lewis County. Although the tribal jury found that
Deputy Myers acted in good faith, they awarded punitive as well as
compensatory damages.12 2 The defendants had objected to the tribal
court jurisdiction from the initiation of the case. Although the record
indicated that the Allen's house was on fee land, not trust land, it did not
indicate who actually owned it. Allen was a member of the tribe
although his wife and the deputy were not.12 3 Deputy Myers and Lewis
County initiated an action in the United States District Court seeking a
declaratory judgment that the tribal court lacked jurisdiction, rendering
its judgment void. The district court granted summary judgment in
115. 141 F.3d 1385 (9th Cir. 1998), withdrawn. 149 F.3d 1228 (9th Cir. 1998), affd on reh'g en
banc, 163 F.3d 509 (9th Cir. 1998).
116. County of Lewis v. Allen, 163 F.3d 509, 511 (9th Cir. 1998).
117. Id.
118. Id. at 512.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id.
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favor of the county and the deputy sheriff 124 The Nez Perce Tribe and
the Nez Perce Tribal Court appealed the decision.
On appeal it was argued that the status of the land determines
whether the tribal court has jurisdiction. It was argued that the tribal
court has jurisdiction over non-Indians for torts on tribal and trust lands,
although not on land held in fee simple by non-Indians. The court was
urged to remand the issue to the tribal court, since the record did not
establish whether the fee land the Allen residence was on was Indian
owned or non-Indian owned. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
rejected this suggestion. 125
The Allen court clearly rejected the argument that the status of the
land underlying the alleged tort was determinative of tribal court
jurisdiction.126 The critical issue, according to the court, is whether the
nonmember has the right to be on the land where the alleged conduct
occurs. In other words, has the tribe lost or given up its right to exclude
the nonmember. If the nonmember of the tribe has the right to remain
where he is, then under Strate, the status of the land or legal title of the
land does not justify the tribe's adjudicative authority. In Allen, the
court concluded that the tribe ceded its "gatekeeping right" to exclude
county officials from engaging in law enforcement activities on the
reservation when it entered into the Joint Law Enforcement Agreement
with the State.127 "From the standpoint of the exercise of adjudicative
authority over nonmember [defendants], it does not matter how the land
was owned because the consent to criminal jurisdiction was tantamount
to alienation of the land to non-Indians .... "128
The court went on to examine the Montana exceptions and deter-
mined neither had been satisfied. In relation to Montana's first excep-
tion the court noted that the cases fitting within that exception "involve
either direct regulation by a tribe of non-Indian activity on the reserva-
tion or lawsuits between a private party and the tribe or tribal members
arising from on-reservation transaction or agreement."1 29 The court, in
conclusory fashion, then noted that the agreement between the tribe and
the State was not a "consensual relationship" sufficient to satisfy
Montana's exception.130
In examining Montana's second exception the court noted:
124. Id. at 513.
125. Id. at 516.
126. Id. at 514.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 515.
130. Id.
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[T]he tribal court plaintiff's status as a tribal member alone
cannot satisfy the second exception. Nor is it sufficient to
argue, as the tribe does, that the exception applies because the
tribe has an interest in the safety of its members. That simply
begs rather than answers the question. Under the tribe's
analysis, the exception would swallow the rule because virtually
every act that occurs on the reservation could be argued to
have some political, economic, health or welfare ramification to
the tribe. 131
The court reiterated the narrow reading of Montana's exception
and cautioned that "the exception must be read to 'sufficiently protect
Indian tribes while at the same time avoiding undue interference with
state sovereignty."" 32 The court also indicated "that subjecting county
law enforcement officers to suit in tribal court was not necessary to
protect Indian tribes or the members who could pursue their cause of
action in state or federal court." The reason this is important is that
both the Strate and the Allen court had noted that alternative state and
federal remedies are an important consideration in examining the extent
of tribal jurisdiction.
Lastly, the court was urged to abstain from ruling on the jurisdic-
tional issues and, instead, to remand the issue to the tribal court for
determination of its own jurisdiction in light of Strate.133 The court
emphasized that exhaustion had already occurred. Moreover, the court
reiterated that exhaustion is a "prudential" not "jurisdictional" rule. 134
The court concluded: "Because we hold that tribal court jurisdiction
does not exist under Montana and Strate, remand would be futile,
serving only to delay judgment day in a case that began in tribal court
eleven years ago. The time has come to close this matter." 135
Thus, the Allen decision indicates that the status of the land underly-
ing the tort is not determinative. Instead, the key is whether the tribe has
lost the ability to exclude the nonmember for whatever reason.
In Wilson v. Marchington,136 the court addressed under what
circumstances a tribal court tort judgment is entitled to recognition in the
United States courts. Marchington involved a traffic accident between
Mary Jane Wilson, who is an enrolled member of the Black Feet Indian
131. Id.
132. Id. (citing Brendale v. Confederated Tribes and Bands of the Yakima Nation, 492 U.S. 408,
431 (1989)).
133. Id. at 516.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. 127 F.3d 805 (9th Cir. 1997).
[VOL. 75:1
STRATE V. A-i CoNTRAcToRs: A PERSPECTIVE
Tribe, and Thomas Marchington, who is not. 137 Marchington was
driving his vehicle on U.S. Highway 2 within the boundaries of the Black
Feet Indian Reservation in Montana. Wilson was driving ahead of
Marchington on the two-lane road and signaled to make a left turn. 138
Marchington apparently unaware or in disregard of Wilson's intent to
turn, attempted to pass her on the left, colliding with her car as she exited
Highway 2. Wilson sued Marchington and his employer139 in the Black
Feet Tribal Court.I4 0 The tribal jury awarded Wilson $246,100.141
Although the Black Feet Court of Appeals reversed the trial court for a
hearing on whether punitive damages had been improperly awarded, the
Black Feet Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals' decision and
reinstated the original judgment.I4 2 Wilson initiated suit in the United
States District Court for the District of Montana in an attempt to register
the tribal court judgment in the federal court system. 143 The district
court reluctantly granted summary judgment in favor of Wilson and the
appeal ensued.
In order to determine whether comity was appropriate, the court
outlined the relevant criteria for such an examination. 144 The court
specifically noted the lack of personal jurisdiction "mandates rejection
of a foreign judgment under the Restatement (Third) and that require-
ment must logically extend to tribal judgments." 145 The court held that:
"Applying the comity analysis to this case, we find that the tribal judg-
ment is not entitled to recognition or enforcement because the tribal
court lacked subject matter jurisdiction, one of the mandatory reasons
for refusing to recognize a tribal court judgment. Our jurisdictional
determination is commanded by Strate v. A-i Contractors .. ."146
Basically, the court undertook an analysis of the land underlying
the accident and concluded that U.S. Highway 2, the road where the
accident between Marchington and Wilson occurred, was similar in all
relevant respects to the highway examined in the Strate case. 147 The
137. Wilson v. Marchington, 127 F.3d 805, 807 (9th Cir. 1997).
138. Id.
139. Wilson was on assignment for his employer at the time of the accident.
140. Wilson, 127 F.3d at 807.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id. Wilson argued her judgment was entitled to full faith and credit or comity.
144. Id. at 809-10. The court noted that "full faith in credit is not extended to tribal judgments by
the Constitution or Congressional act, and we decline to extend it judicially." Id. at 809.
145. Id. at 810-11. The court determined that the existence of subject matter jurisdiction is
mandatory under the Uniform Foreign Money-Judgments Recognition Act and thus in order for
federal court recognition of a tribal judgment both personal and subject matter jurisdiction must exist.
Id. at 811.
146. Id. at 813.
147. Id.
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highway involved a right-of-way granted to the state of Montana by the
tribe, the tribe had consented to the right-of-way, and the public had
unrestricted access to Highway 2.
Thus, in most respects, Wilson v. Marchington involved a simple
application of the Strate decision. However, what is important about the
decision is the court's examination of the Montana second exception.
Wilson and several amici supporting her claim argued that "a traffic
accident injuring a tribal member sufficiently affects the economic
security, political integrity, or health and welfare of the tribe, thus satis-
fying the second Montana exception."1 48 The court noted that the
Court in Strate basically rejected this argument when it observed that
although those who drive carelessly on the highway surely jeopardize the
safety of tribal members, Montana's second exception requires more.149
Thus, the Marchington case applied the Strate analysis even though the
plaintiff was an enrolled member of the tribe. Therefore, what was im-
plicit in the Strate decision, that it is the status of the defendant being a
non-consenting non-Indian which divests jurisdiction, was made explicit
in Marchington. The arguments of tribal proponents attempting to limit
Strate to cases involving two non-Indians has proven less than successful.
In Hornell Brewing Company v. Rosebud Sioux Tribal Court,150 the
Eighth Circuit addressed tribal court jurisdiction in the aftermath of
Strate. This case involved the manufacture, sale, and distribution of an
alcohol beverage called "The Original Crazy Horse Malt Liquor."15'
The estate of Crazy Horse152 filed suit in tribal court asserting causes for
defamation, violation of the estates right of publicity, and negligent and
intentional infliction of emotional distress.1 53 The estate sought both
injunctive and declaratory relief as well as damages. The tribal judge,
the Honorable Stanley E. Whiting, pro-tem tribunal judge of the Rose-
bud Sioux Tribal Court, dismissed the estates' complaint on the grounds
that the tribal court lacked personal jurisdiction over the breweries and it
lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the claims.154 On appeal, the
Rosebud Sioux Supreme Court reversed holding that the breweries had
sufficient contacts with the Rosebud Sioux Reservation to uphold both
process and jurisdiction.
148. Id. at 814.
149. Id. at 814-15.
150. 133 F.3d 1087 (8th Cir. 1998).
151. Hornell Brewing Co. v. Rosebud Sioux Tribal Court, 133 F.3d 1087, 1089 (8th Cir. 1998).
152. Tasunke Witko, a leader of the Oglala Sioux, who died in 1877.
153. Hornell Brewing Co., 133 F.3d at 1089.
154. Id. at 1089.
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The breweries then filed suit in the United States District Court for
the District of South Dakota against the estate and the tribal court. 155
The district court enjoined the tribal court from conducting any further
proceedings noting that it disagreed with the rationale the court had used
to find subject matter jurisdiction. In particular, the Rosebud Sioux
Supreme Court had held that Montana was inapplicable to the case
because it was specifically limited to fee lands and dealt with regulatory
rather than adjudicatory authority.I 5 6 These were the arguments directly
raised and rejected in Strate. The federal district court ruled that the
Montana case was applicable and that since neither exception had been
satisfied, the tribal court lacked subject matter jurisdiction. However, the
court concluded that since the breweries had not exhausted their reme-
dies the matter should be remanded to tribal court for a full opportunity
to determine the jurisdictional issue.157 On appeal, the Ninth Circuit
began its discussion by quoting Strate: "absent express authorization by
federal statute or treaty, tribal jurisdiction over the conduct of nonmem-
bers exists only in limited circumstances." 158 The court then specifical-
ly noted:
Indian tribes do, however, 'retain inherent sovereign power to
exercise some forms of civil jurisdiction over non-Indians on
their reservations.' The operative phrase is 'on their reserva-
tions.' Neither Montana nor its progeny purports to allow
Indian tribes to exercise civil jurisdiction over the activities or
conduct of non-Indians occurring outside their reservations. 159
The tribal appellants argued that the Montana second exception had
been satisfied because the use of the Crazy Horse name for the sale of an
alcoholic beverage had a direct effect on the political and economic
security of the tribe. The court rejected this argument noting "we deem
this issue misleading." 160 The court found the issue misleading because
the activity on which the complaint was based was the sale and distri-
bution of an alcoholic beverage. The court specifically noted that the
sale and distribution did not occur on the reservation. Thus, where the
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 1090-91. The Rosebud Sioux Supreme Court, in its opinion, indicated that the plaintiffs
had made out "a prima facie" case for jurisdiction. The district court noted that the question of the
jurisdiction should have been determined by a preponderance of the evidence rather than merely a
prima facie case of jurisdiction. Therefore, the district court order remanded the case to the tribal
court to complete that review. Id. at 1091.
158. Id. at 1091 (quoting Strate v. A-I Contractors, 117 S. Ct. 1404, 1409 (1997) (citations
omitted)).
159. Id. (quoting Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 565 (1981)).
160. Id. at 1093.
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conduct did not occur on the reservation there would be no plausible
basis for jurisdiction. The court concluded that: "Following the ad-
monition of the Supreme Court in Strate, we think it plain that the
Breweries' conduct outside the Rosebud Sioux Reservation does not fall
within the Tribe's inherent sovereign authority. We deem it clear the
tribal court lacks adjudicatory authority over disputes arising from such
conduct."161 Hornell Brewing thus provided explicitly what had been
implicit for some time. Activities must occur within the reservation in
order to even plausibly support tribal court jurisdiction.
VII. CONCLUSION
The question remains what lesson do we take away from Strate. I
think there are four main holdings that come out of the decision. First,
the notion of inherent tribal sovereignty over nonmembers has ended.
National Farmers Union and Iowa Mutual were simple exhaustion cases.
Neither case supported the assumption of "presumed" jurisdiction over
nonmembers. This was perhaps both the largest single blow to tribal
jurisdiction and yet the most predictable.
Second, Strate provided a very restrictive reading of the two Mon-
tana exceptions. Thus, the "consensual relationship" test is basically
restricted to commercial arrangements and matters arising directly
thereunder; likely excluding all torts. The "direct effects" exception is
severely limited. Indeed, this exception primarily relates to tribal self-
government and internal relations. Absent the involvement of a govern-
mental purpose (taxation), this exception will rarely, if ever, be met in
individual tort cases.
Third, Strate leaves open the question of what impact the status of
the land has on the jurisdictional issue. In particular, Strate did not
address what outcome would result if the action had occurred on a tribal
road. However, in reviewing the language of Strate, and a subsequent
decision 62 it appears that if non-Indians have the right to be on the land,
the Indians have lost the right to exclude. Without the right to exclude
the Montana rule divesting jurisdiction absent a tribal interest will likely
be applied. Thus, while Strate leaves open the question of the outcome
if the accident had occurred on tribal roads, its reasoning, analysis, and
logic dictate the same result.
Fourth, in perhaps what was the most important aspect of the Strate
decision, the court addressed the issue of exhausting tribal remedies
161. Id. Given its holding, the court determined that exhaustion of tribal court remedies
regarding the jurisdictional issues was unnecessary. Id.
162. See supra notes 115-135 and accompanying text.
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prior to seeking federal court intervention. 163 Footnote fourteen has
opened the door for litigants in tribal court to seek federal court review
much more quickly than before. 164
Perhaps the best law review article this writer has read addressing
Indian law, written by L. Scott Gould165 suggested that the "consent
paradigm that has emerged in the past two decades largely replaces the
doctrine of inherent sovereignty, the conceptual underpinning of tribal
power over territory that had endured for more than 160 years."166 The
Strate decision is simply another step or piece of the consent paradigm.
Tribes have long and vigorously fought for inherent sovereignty over all
territory within their reservations, which is the equivalent of an indepen-
dent foreign government. As indicated above, Strate indicates that the
concept of inherent territorial sovereignty no longer exists. Thus, juris-
diction over non-Indians will be appropriate, under the present case law,
only in situations where the person or entity consents to jurisdiction
which is a restrictive application of Montana's first exception, or the
activities have a "direct effect" on the tribe. This direct effect must be
in relation to tribal self-governance or internal relations. To date, tribes
have understandably been unwavering in their notion of inherent
sovereignty. Battles over jurisdiction and inherent sovereignty have been
waged in the courts. The litigation has been counterproductive to all par-
ties. It is time for all parties to work together within the congressional
legislative arena to outline and adopt reasonable boundaries and guide-
lines regarding tribal court jurisdiction. Absent cooperative legislative
effort, it appears the court system will not allow the tribes to achieve their
desired result.
163. See supra notes 97-100 and accompanying text.
164. Footnote 14 has already been relied on by the Eighth Circuit to all but eliminate the ex-
haustion requirement. See Hornell Brewing Co. v. Rosebud Sioux Tribal Court, 133 F.3d 1087 (8th Cir.
1998). Cf. National Farmers Union Ins. Co. v. Crow Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 845, 856 n.21 (1985)
(noting that exhaustion would not be required where the exertion of jurisdiction "is motivated by a
desire to harass or is conducted in bad faith," or where the action is patently violative of express
jurisdictional prohibitions, or where exhaustion would be futile because of the lack of an opportunity to
challenge the court's jurisdiction).
165. Gould, supra note 91.
166. Id. at 894.
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